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Abstract 
This paper studies business cycle interdependence among the industrialized countries since 
1958. Using the spillover index methodology recently proposed by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009a) 
and based on the generalized VAR framework, we develop an alternative measure of 
comovement of macroeconomic aggregates across countries.  We have several important results. 
First, the spillover index fluctuates over time, increasing substantially following the post-1973 
U.S. recessions.  Secondly, the band within which the spillover index fluctuates follows an 
upward trend since the start of the globalization process in the early 1990s.  Thirdly, the 
spillover index recorded the sharpest increase ever following the peak of the global financial 
crisis in September 2008, reaching a record level as of December 2008 (See 
http://data.economicresearchforum.org/erf/bcspill.aspx?lang=en for updates of the spillover 
plot).  We also derive measures of directional spillovers and show that the U.S. (1980s and 
2000s) and Japan (1970s and 2000s) are the major transmitters of shocks to other countries. 
Finally, during the current global economic recession shocks mostly originated from the United 
States and spread to other industrialized countries.  
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Key words: Business Cycles, Spillovers, Industrial Production, Vector Autoregression, 





Acknowledgements: I thank Frank Diebold, Ayhan Köse and participants of the Society for Economic Dynamics 
2009 Annual Meetings in Istanbul for very helpful comments.  
Correspondence Address:  Kamil Yilmaz, Department of Economics, Koç University, Rumelifeneri Yolu, Sariyer,  
Istanbul 34450, Turkey. E-mail: kyilmaz@ku.edu.tr, Tel: +90 212 338 1458, Fax: +90 212 338 1653. 
   1
I.  Introduction 
What started in the United States as the sub-prime mortgage crisis in 2007 has since been transformed 
into a severe global financial crisis that inflicted all major advanced and emerging economies.  Indeed, 
the global economy is experiencing the worst recession in decades, if not a global depression.  As 
expected, the global recession increased the academic and policy interest in the business cycles 
research.   
There has been quite an extensive literature on international business cycles that dates back to 
early 1990s. Since then, research on business cycles across countries has displayed ample evidence that 
macroeconomic fluctuations in industrial and developing countries have a lot in common.  Using pair-
wise correlations of GDP, Backus et al. (1995) and Baxter (1995) show that output in major industrial 
countries follow similar short run paths.  Employing a Bayesian dynamic latent factor model, Kose, 
Otrok and Whiteman (2003)  find strong support for a persistent world common factor that drives 
business cycles in 60 countries.  In a recent paper, using a multicountry Bayesian VAR model with time 
variations, Canova, Ciccarelli, and Ortega (2007) also find evidence in favor of world business cycles 
among the G-7 countries.  They also show that the world- and -country-specific fluctuations are more 
synchronized in contractions rather than expansions.
1    
As the evidence on international business cycles accumulated, the literature started to focus on 
the effect of globalization on international business cycles. Kose et al. (2003)  find that with increased 
globalization, the impact of the world factor on the correlation of macroeconomic aggregates (output, 
consumption and investment) across countries increased in the 1990s and after. More recently, Kose et 
al. (2008) extend their previous findings to the second moments of output, consumption and investment. 
Doyle and Faust (2005), on the other hand, found no evidence of increased correlation of growth rates 
of output in the United States and in other G-7 countries over time.   Stock and Watson (2005) show 
                                                 
1 In addition, empirical studies employing time series and spectral methods also find support for the presence of 
international business cycles (See Gregory et al., 1997, Lumsdaine and Prasad, 2003).   2
that the comovement of macroeconomic aggregates has declined in the globalization era of 1984-2002.  
However, rather than linking their results directly to the globalization process, Stock and Watson (2002) 
conclude that their results are likely due to diminished importance of common shocks among the G-7 
countries. Eickmeier (2007) emphasizes that the impact of globalization on international propagation of 
macroeconomic shocks is unclear and needs to be studied further.       
This paper develops a business cycle spillover index across G-6 countries using forecast-error 
variance decompositions obtained from a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model to differentiate 
between own-shocks versus spillover of shocks.   Diebold and Yilmaz (2009a) recently proposed this 
methodology to study return and volatility spillovers across major stock markets around the world.  We 
apply the spillover index methodology to the seasonally adjusted monthly industrial production indices 
for G-6 countries (excluding Canada from the G-7 group).   
The spillover index framework is simple to implement.  It follows directly from the variance 
decomposition associated with an N-variable vector autoregression, where all variables in the system, in 
our case industrial production indices, are assumed to be endogenous.  The time-variation in spillovers 
is potentially of great interest as the intensity of business cycle spillovers is likely to vary over time.  
Using a rolling windows approach and calculating the spillover index for each window, we allow the 
business cycle spillovers across G-6 countries to vary over time since 1958.  We show that business 
cycle spillovers across G-6 countries are important; spillover intensity is indeed time-varying; and the 
United States and Japan are the major transmitters of business cycle shocks to other countries. 
The spillover index framework is different from earlier studies of international business cycles, 
in that, rather than finding a common world factor or indicator that measures international business 
cycles we identify how shocks to industrial production in one country affect the industrial output in 
other countries. Obviously, one is likely to find evidence for international business cycles either if the 
shocks are common and/or country-specific shocks spill over across countries in a significant manner. 
Unlike the previous contributions to the literature, the spillover methodology also allows one to identify   3
directional spillovers transmitted from one country to others, as well as the spillovers across country 
pairs (see Diebold and Yilmaz, 2009b). 
Finally, our study differs from the majority of earlier contributions to the literature in terms of 
the data used.  We use industrial production indices at monthly frequency rather than the quarterly data 
from the national income accounts. There are two reasons for this choice.  First, the use of monthly data 
allows us to capture the spillovers of shocks much faster, as seen in the latest economic crisis.  Second, 
the use of monthly data allows us to have more observations in calculating the spillover index for each 
rolling sample window.  
In the rest of the paper we proceed as follows. In Section 2, we discuss the spillover index 
methodology, emphasizing in particular the use of generalized variance decompositions and directional 
spillovers. In Section 3, we first discuss the time-series properties of industrial production indices for 
G-6 countries and then present the results of the business cycle spillovers analysis. In particular we 
discuss the total spillover plot along with the gross and net directional spillover plots for each of the G-
6 countries.  Section 4 concludes the paper. 
II. The Spillover Index Methodology  
In this section, we provide a brief summary of the the  spillover index.  As we have already mentioned 
in the Introduction, the spillover index is built upon the familiar notion of a variance decomposition 
associated with an N-variable vector autoregression. Actually the sum of off-diagonal elements of the 
variance-covariance matrix for the forecast error relative to the sum of all elements is actually what we 
call the total spillover index.  
However, any study of the business cycle spillovers also needs to include directional spillovers 
across countries.  It is a well known fact that Cholesky factorization, upon which the spillover index 
was built, allows one to consider orthogonalized shocks to variables in the model.  However, the 
resulting impulse responses and variance decompositions are not robust to a change in the order of   4
variables.  As a result, it is difficult to use the variance decompositions from the Cholesky factor 
orthogonalization to study the direction of spillovers. With this understanding, Diebold and Yilmaz 
(2009b) progress by measuring directional spillovers in a generalized VAR framework that eliminates 
the possible dependence of results on ordering.     
Consider a covariance stationary N-variable VAR(p), 
1
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The moving average coefficients (or transformations such as impulse response functions or variance 
decompositions) are the key to understanding dynamics.  We rely on variance decompositions, which 
allow us to split the forecast error variances of each variable into parts attributable to the various system 
shocks.  Variance decompositions allow us to assess the fraction of the H-step-ahead error variance in 
forecasting  i x  that is due to shocks to , j x ji ≠ , for each i. 
    Calculation of variance decompositions requires orthogonal innovations, whereas our VAR 
innovations are generally correlated.  Identification schemes such as that based on Cholesky 
factorization achieve orthogonality, but the variance decompositions then depend on the ordering of the 
variables. We circumvent this problem by exploiting the generalized VAR framework of Koop, Pesaran 
and Potter (1996), and Pesaran and Shin (1998), which produces variance decompositions invariant to 
ordering.   
Let us define own variance shares to be the fractions of the H-step-ahead error variances in 
forecasting i x due to shocks to i x , for i=1, 2,..,N and cross variance shares, or spillovers, to be the 
fractions of the H-step-ahead error variances in forecasting i x due to shocks to j x , for i, j = 1, 2,.., N, 
such that ij ≠ .     5
The generalized impulse response and variance decomposition analyses also rely on equation 
(2). Pesaran and Shinn (1998) showed that when the error term ( t ε )  has  a multivariate normal 
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Denoting the generalized H-step-ahead forecast error variance decompositions by  ()
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Note that unlike the ones obtained through Cholesky factorization, generalized H-step-ahead forecast 
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To normalize the variance decompositions obtained from the generalized approach, we sum all 
(own and spillover of shocks) contributions to a country’s industrial production (business cycle) 
forecast error. When we divide each source of industrial production shock by the total of industrial 
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Total Spillovers 
Using the industrial production contributions from the generalized variance decomposition approach, 































We now consider directional spillovers in addition to total spillovers.  We measure directional business 





























In similar fashion, we measure directional business cycle spillovers transmitted by market i to all other 





























One can think of the set of directional spillovers as providing a decomposition of total spillovers into 
those transmitted by each country in the sample. 
Net Spillovers 
Finally, we obtain the net business cycle spillovers transmitted from market i to all other markets j as:   
() () ()
gg g
ii i SH SH SH =− ii .   7
Net spillovers are simply the difference between gross business cycle shocks transmitted to and gross 
business cycle shocks received from all other markets. 
III. The Empirics of Business Cycle Spillovers  
In our empirical analysis, we use monthly observations of the seasonally adjusted industrial production 
(IPSA) indices from January 1958 to May 2009.  Even though it is one of the G-7 countries, we do not 
include Canada in our analysis, because the Canadian IPSA is highly correlated with the IPSA of the 
United States.
2   
Seasonally Adjusted Industrial Production Series:  Unit Roots and Cointegration  
Before going ahead with the analysis of business cycle spillovers, we first test whether the seasonally 
adjusted industrial production series for G-6 countries are stationary or not. We use the most-preferred 
augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test for this purpose. Test results for the whole period (1958:01-
2009:05) are presented in Table 1. For all G-6 countries, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test fails to reject 
the null hypothesis that the log of IPSA series (allowed to have a constant and a linear trend term) 
possess a unit root even at the ten percent level of significance.  This result obviously implies that none 
of the six IPSA series are stationary in levels.  Applying the tests to the first-differenced log IPSA 
series, however, we reject the non-stationarity of this series for all six countries at the one percent level 
of significance.  Together these results indicate that all IPSA series included in our analysis are 
integrated of order one, I(1).    
                                                 
2     Year-on-year industrial production growth rates for the two countries have a correlation coefficient of almost 
86 percent, much higher than the correlation coefficients for other country pairs (See Table A-1).   Similarly, the 
correlation coefficient between the monthly IPSA industrial production growth rates of the two countries is much 
higher than the ones for other pairs of countries (See Table A-2, 0.38 vs. 0.26 the next higher correlation 
coefficient between the US and Japan).  Artis et al. (1997) show that with a value of 85.6% the contingency 
correlation coefficient between the US and the Canadian industrial production is the highest.     8
Once we show that all industrial production indices in our sample possess a unit root, we then 
test for the presence of a cointegration relationship among these six series. Johansen cointegration test 
results (both trace and maximum eigenvalue tests) show that there is a single cointegration relationship 
among the seasonally adjusted IP series for the G-6 countries over the 1958:01-2009:05 (See Table 2).  
Altogether test results imply that, instead of estimating a VAR model for the industrial production 
series for the G-6 countries, we need to estimate a Vector Error Correction (VEC) model, which is 
effectively the VAR in first differences with the lagged error correction term from the cointegration 
equation included.   
The Business Cycle Spillover Table 
In the empirical analysis of business cycle spillovers we first estimate the VEC model for the 
full sample and report the spillover index and the directional spillovers in Table 3 along with the 
underlying generalized variance decomposition.   
The spillover index for the full sample period is 68.7%, indicating that more than two-thirds of 
the total variance of the forecast errors for G-6 countries is explained by spillovers of shocks across 
countries, whereas the remaining 31% is explained by idiosyncratic shocks.  It is important at this stage 
to note that the rather high value of the spillover index is driven by the observations in 2009.  In a 
previous version of the paper, the spillover index for the period from 1958:01 to 2008:12 was only 
27%. The inclusion of just 5 observations leads to a significant jump in the index.  
In terms of the directional spillovers transmitted to others (measured by  ()
g
i SH i ) throughout 
the full sample, the US is the country that contributed the most to other countries’ forecast error 
variance (170.3 points, which is equivalent to 28.3% of the total forecast error variance to be 
explained), followed by Italy (116.6). According to the full sample directional spillover measures, 
Japan and Germany contributed the least to other countries’ forecast error variance (19.8 and 20.5 
points, respectively), followed by the UK (30.5).     9
In terms of the directional spillovers received from others,  ()
g
i SH i , the US appears to be the 
country that received the least of spillovers from other countries (26, equivalent to just 4.3% of the total 
forecast error variance to be explained) followed by Italy (56.5) and the UK (74.2).  Germany received 
the most (91.7) in terms of spillovers from other countries.    
Finally, when we calculate the difference between the column-wise sum (what we call as 
“contribution from others”) and the row-wise sum (what we call as “contribution to others”), we obtain 
the net directional spillovers given by ()
g
i SH . The US (144.2) and Italy (60) are net transmitters of 
industrial production shocks to other countries, while Japan and other European countries in the sample 
(Germany -71.2, Japan -66.9, UK -43.6 and France -22.5) are net recipients of business cycle spillovers 
over the full sample.  
Dynamics I:  The Rolling-Sample Business Cycle Spillover Plot 
The spillover table for the full sample provides important clues as to how the spillover index is 
calculated and interpreted.  However, as we emphasized in the introduction, our focus is more on the 
dynamics of business cycle spillovers over time. The fact that the inclusion of Jan-May 2009 
observations in the data set led to a substantial jump in the spillover index definitely highlights the need 
to study the dynamics of spillovers over time.  
As VEC is the correct model for the full sample, our dynamic analysis of spillovers also relies 
on the variance decomposition from the VEC model estimated over rolling 5-year windows.   Here is 
how we obtain the spillover plot: We estimate the VEC model for the first 5-year sub-sample window 
(April 1958-March 1963) and obtain the value for the generalized variance decomposition-based 
spillover index (from now on, the spillover index).  Moving the sub-sample window one month ahead, 
we obtain the spillover index for the next window and so on. Graphing the spillover index values for all 
sub-sample windows gives us the spillover plot.   10
In Figure 1, we present the rolling sample generalized spillover index plot alone. In Figure 2, 
we present the spillover index along with the spillover index based on the Cholesky variance 
decomposition (from now on, the Cholesky VD-based spillover index).  We plot the two indices as an 
area band rather than two different lines. Figure 2 reveals that the difference between the two indices is 
in general not very large for all sub-sample windows considered, seldom exceeding 10 percentage 
points.  Even though the small gap between the two indices varies over time, the two indices tend to 
move very much in harmony.  Therefore, it would be sufficient to focus on the generalized VD-based 
spillover index for the time being.   
Let us now focus on Figure 1 again. Our first observation about the spillover plot is the absence 
of a long-run trend.  The spillover plot clearly shows that while there are periods during which shocks 
to industrial production are transmitted substantially to others, there are yet other periods during which 
the spillovers of output shocks were much less important.  Actually, during or after all U.S. recessions 
(indicated by shaded bars in Figures 1 through 7), the spillover index recorded significant upward 
movements. The only exception is the 1969-70 recession, during which the index moves down.  In 
addition, the index goes up in late 1993, and after a brief correction in late 1994, it goes up again in 
1995. While there is no U.S. recession during this period, France, Germany, Italy and Japan 
experienced recessions ending in late 1993 or early 1994 (See ECRI, 2008). As a result, the upward 
move in the spillover index is most likely due to the spillovers originating from these countries.   
Second, while the spillover index fluctuates over time, we can differentiate between several 
trends. First, during the 1973-75 recession the spillover index increases by almost 20-25 percentage 
points and fluctuates around 50 percent after the 1981-82 recession.  Starting in 1984, the spillover 
index declines all the way down to 35 percent.  This result is consistent with findings of McConnell and 
Perez-Quiros (2000), and Blanchard and Simon (2001) that the volatility of U.S. GDP declined after 
1984 (great moderation).  As the volatility of GDP declines, the spillover index declines down to pre-
1973 levels.    11
Third, after the great moderation era of the late 1980s, the behavior of the spillover index 
reflects the influence of globalization.  From 1989 onwards, the band within which the spillover index 
fluctuates starts to move upwards with the current wave of globalization which started in earnest in 
early 1990s.  As the sample windows are rolled to include 1996, the index reaches 60%, but declines 
down to 40% as the data for the late 1990s and 2000 are included.  The index starts to increase again 
towards the end of the mild recession of 2000-2001, reaching 60% by the end of 2002.  However as the 
other G-6 countries followed the quickly recovering US economy to a major expansion, the spillover 
index reached 65% in the second quarter of 2004.  The index then declines to 60% again as the window 
is rolled to include second half of 2004, and then gradually moves down reaching its bottom around 
40% from the last quarter of 2006 until the first quarter of 2008.   
When we focus on the behavior of the index since 1989, we observe three complete cycles.  It 
is interesting to note that, each time the cycle lasts longer and has a larger bandwidth than the previous 
one. During the first cycle which lasts from 1989 to the end of 1992, the index fluctuates between 33% 
and 45%, while in the second cycle that lasts from 1993 to 1999 the index fluctuates between 37% and 
56%.  Finally, during the third cycle from 2001 to 2007, the index fluctuates between 44% and 65% 
percent.     
This result supports Kose et al.’s (2003) finding that with the globalization process the business 
cycles have become more synchronized. It basically indicates that the comovement of industrial 
production fluctuations tends to be more significant since the late 1980s.  This result is also consistent 
with Doyle and Faust’s (2005) conclusion that the correlation coefficients among the industrial 
production series are not high since the late 1980s.  The output fluctuations tend to move more together 
during periods of high spillover index, compared to the periods with low spillover index.  When one 
analyzes the period since the late 1980s as a whole, he/she may not obtain high correlation coefficients.    12
Next we focus on the most important part of our results, namely the behavior of the spillover 
index since June 2008.  We want to focus on its most recent behavior, not only because it gives us more 
clues about business cycle spillovers since the beginning of the sub-prime crisis in the United States, 
but also because the index reccorded the biggest jump in its history.  The index jumped from 53% in 
June to 71% in September, and then to 80% as the December observation is included in the sample. 
With the inclusion of January-May 2009 observations, the index declined slightly down to 69%.   
The behavior of the index during the 2008-09 global recession is in stark contrast to previous 
recession episodes.  It has increased 42 percentage points from April to December 2009.  During the 
recession following the first oil price hikes, the spillover index recorded a relatively smaller increase, 
from a low of 30 to a high of 61, in a matter of four years, from 1972 to 1976.  The jump in the index 
during the current global recession is an indication of how G-6 countries are pulling each other down.  
So far we have discussed the spillover plot based on 5-year rolling windows.  Obviously here 
the window size is a critical factor that can have an impact on the shape of the spillover plot. For that 
reason, we present the spillover plots for 4, 6, and 7-year rolling windows in Figure 4.  Irrespective of 
the window size we choose, the spillover index follows similar patterns.  For example, in all three plots 
the spillover index jumps between 30 and 40 points since the start of the 2008-09 global recession.  
Furthermore, as the window size increases, the spillover plot becomes smoother, giving 
additional clues about the business cycle spillovers. Our result that the band within which the spillover 
index fluctuates increases during the current globalization process continues to hold with 4, 6 and 7-
year rolling windows. 
 
                                                 
3   There is a spike in the index in May 1968, as the French industrial production makes its largest (38%) historical 
drop in May 1968, which was followed by 23% and 19% increases in June and July. However, the sudden drop in 
May 1968 did not have any lasting impact on industrial output in France and in other G-6 countries.    13
Dynamics II:  The Rolling-Sample Directional Business Cycle Spillover Plots 
Following a detailed analysis of the business cycle spillover index, we can now focus on directional 
spillovers across countries. As described in detail in Section 2, directional spillovers are critical in 
understanding the respective roles of each of the G-6 countries in spreading domestic shocks to local 
industry output to other countries.   
During the 1970s, Japan has been the most important source country of spillovers (measured 
both gross (Figure 7) and net (Figure 9) terms). During the 1973-1975 recession and during the second 
half of the 1970s, the spillovers originated from Japan to others reached as high as 25% of the total 
gross spillovers (Figure 7), whereas the spillovers received by Japan from others was only around 8% 
of the total spillovers (Figure 8), leading the net spillovers from Japan to reach as high as 20% of the 
total spillovers (Figure 9).   Germany was the second most important source of business cycle spillovers 
during the 1970s.  United States, on the other hand, was a net recipient of business cycle spillovers over 
the most of the 1970s, with the exception of the 1973-1975 recession.  
The roles were reversed in the 1980s: the United States has become the major net transmitter of 
the spillovers, whereas Japan became the net recipient of spillovers. The gross spillovers transmitted by 
the United States to others jumped above 15%, and as high as 30%, and net spillovers fluctuated 
between 10-15% after the 1982 U.S. recession.  Japan’s net spillovers, on the other hand, declined to as 
low as -11% of total spillovers after the 1982 recession and stayed at low levels until the end of 1987. 
While Germany and the U.K. were also net positive transmitters of spillovers after the 1982 recession, 
their roles were rather secondary compared to the United States and Japan (Figure 9). 
Throughout the 1990s, Japan was neither a net transmitter nor a net recipient of the business 
cycle spillovers among the G-6 countries. We think that this result is consistent with the decade-long 
recession Japan had suffered with almost no effect on other G-6 countries. Neither was the United 
States nor was Germany major net transmitters of spillovers in the 1990s. It was rather France, Italy and   14
United Kingdom that were net positive transmitters of spillovers, even though the spillovers originating 
from these countries were not as large and not as persistent as the ones that originated from the U.S., 
Japan and Germany in the 1970s and 1980s. The role these countries played during the 1990s is closely 
related to the aftermath of the ERM crisis of 1992 and the ensuing slowdown in these economies.  
Moving closer to our times, the United States and Japan returned to their locomotive roles in 
the 2000s with a 10% net spillover transmission to other countries. Germany and France, on the other 
hand, have been the net recipients of spillovers in the 2000s. Italy’s role as a transmitter of gross 
spillovers also increased in the 2000s, but as a net transmitter its role continued to be rather small along 
with that of the United Kingdom.  
Lately, with a -10% net spillover transmission rate since 2007, Japan has become a net recipient 
rather than a net transmitter of business cycle spillovers. In the meantime, the net spillovers from the 
U.S. gradually increased with the intensification of the sub-prime crisis since mid-2007.  As 
emphasized above, since September 2008, the total spillover index jumped substantially up to reach 
close to 80% and the United States was the most important contributor to the increase in business cycle 
spillovers, with a net spillover contribution of more than 25%.  The gross directional spillovers from the 
U.S. jumped close to 33% since the collapse of the Lehman Brothers in September 2008. While the 
United States is the major net transmitter of shocks to others, Italy, with a negative annualized growth 
rate in the third quarter of 2008, has also been pulling down other countries, albeit with a smaller force. 
Other countries appear to be net recipients of shocks through the United States and Italy. 
The spillover index methodology also allows us to analyze the net pair-wise directional 
spillovers (Figure 10). To start with the US-Japan pair, it is interesting to note that the US dominated 
Japan in terms of business cycle spillovers from May 1982 until the end of 1987, with net spillovers 
reaching as high as the 10% of the total G-6 wide spillovers. After a brief respite the directional 
spillovers from the US to Japan started in during 1990-1991.  Japan had never had large business cycle 
spillovers to the US.  Net spillovers from Japan to the US reached at most 5% of the total forecast error   15
variance towards the end of the 1973-1975 recession and lasted until the 1980 recession.  Japan also had 
some influence on the US business cycles in the early 1990s as its decade-long recession started. 
However, since then, spillovers from Japan to the US have been rather limited.  
During the 2000s, a large portion of the spillovers were generated among the Germany-Japan, 
Germany-Italy, Japan-Italy and France-Italy pairs. While shocks that hit Japanese industrial production 
exerted some significant influence on industrial production in Germany and Italy during the early 
2000s, shocks to Italian industrial production spilled over to influence the behavior of French and 
German industrial production series over the same period.  
IV. Conclusions 
Using the spillover index methodology introduced by Diebold and Yilmaz (2009a and 2009b), we 
develop an alternative measure of comovement of macroeconomic aggregates across major 
industrialized countries.  We use forecast-error variance decompositions from Vector Error Correction 
(VEC) model to calculate the business cycle spillover index across G-6 countries. 
We make several important contributions to the literature on international business cycles.  Our 
spillover index methodology is different from the empirical approaches widely used in the literature. 
While the factor model approach aims at obtaining a world business cycle measure, the spillover index 
framework distinguishes between idiosyncratic shocks to industrial production and spillover of 
industrial production shocks from other countries.  Furthermore, we think that the spillover index that is 
based on a multivariate VEC can better be placed to capture the increased comovement of business 
fluctuations in more than two countries compared  to an analysis based on bi-variate correlation 
coefficients.   
Second, the analysis sheds new light on the nature of business cycles, clearly showing that the 
cross-country comovement of business fluctuations is not constant over time, nor does it follow an   16
upward trend.  Rather, the business cycle spillovers fluctuate substantially over time.  However, the 
band within which the spillover index fluctuates increased since 1984.  This result is consistent with the 
findings of both Kose et al. (2003) and Doyle and Faust (2005): When shocks in individual countries 
are not significant, they can not be expected to spill over to other countries irrespective of the degree of 
integration among these countries. When the shocks are big enough to spill over to other countries, then 
the correlation of macroeconomic aggregates across countries will be greater.  
Third, the directional spillover measures help us identify each country as gross and/or net 
transmitters of business cycle shocks to other countries as well as gross recipients of business cycle 
shocks from other countries over different time periods. The directional spillover measures show that 
the U.S. (1980s and 2000s) and Japan (1970s and 2000s) are the major transmitters of shocks to other 
countries.  
Last, but not the least, with an unprecedented jump between September and December 2008, 
the business cycle spillover index captures the global nature of the current recession perfectly. Given 
how fast the shocks spill over across countries, it is legitimate to argue that the recovery from the 
current recession/depression requires coordinated policy actions among the major industrial and 
emerging economies.  
In this paper we limited our attention to the study of business cycle spillovers across the G-6 
countries only.  In our future research, we plan to study the business cycle spillovers across major 
emerging market economies along with the G-6 countries. It is also interesting to study the spillovers of 
shocks in labor markets, using the unemployment rates for major industrial countries.    17
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Table 1. Unit Root Test – G-6 Industrial Production  
(1958:01-2009:05) 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test Statistics 
  France Germany  Italy  Japan  UK  USA 
 Log levels (with constant 
term and trend)  -0.942 -2.440 -1.510  -2.283 -0.869 -2.649 
Log first  differences (with 
constant term)  -25.639 -12.946 -32.406  -8.389 -29.137  -10.089 
Critical Values for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test 
  1% 5% 10% 
 Log levels (with constant term and trend)  -3.973 -3.417  -3.131 
 Log first  differences (with constant term)  -3.441 -2.866  -2.569 
 Notes:   In applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test to log industrial production we include a constant term   
and a trend, but only a constant term in the case of first differences of log industrial production. Critical values for 







Table 2:  Johansen Cointegration Test - G-6 Industrial Production 
(1958:01-2009:05) 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Trace)   
Hypothesized   Trace  0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Eigenvalue  Statistic Critical  Value P-Value 
None *   0.0694   109.18  95.75   0.004 
At most 1   0.0458   65.16  69.82   0.111 
At most 2   0.0262   36.46  47.86   0.374 
At most 3   0.0189   20.19  29.80   0.410 
At most 4   0.0087   8.51  15.49   0.413 
At most 5   0.0052   3.17  3.84   0.075 
Unrestricted Cointegration Rank Test (Maximum Eigenvalue) 
Hypothesized     0.05   
No. of CE(s)  Maximum Eigenvalue Statistic Critical  Value  P-value 
None *  44.02  40.08  0.017 
At most 1  28.70  33.88  0.183 
At most 2  16.27  27.58  0.642 
At most 3  11.68  21.13  0.579 
At most 4  5.34  14.26  0.699 
At most 5  3.17  3.84  0.075 
Notes: We assume that there is a linear deterministic trend in the data and an intercept in the 




Table 3:  Business Cycle Spillover Table for G-6 Countries  
(1958:01-2009:05) 
 USA  Germany  Japan France UK  Italy  Directional
FROM Others
USA  74.0 1.3  3.5  2.5 5.0 13.7  26.0 
Germany  33.6 8.3  6.4  16.7 6.0  29.2  91.7 
Japan  32.3 6.3  13.2  15.1 9.5  23.7  86.8 
France   28.0 7.5  5.2  23.0 7.2  29.0  77.0 
UK  38.3 2.4  2.5  10.0 25.8  21.0  74.2 
Italy  38.2 3.0  2.4  10.3 2.8  43.5  56.5 
Directional TO Others  170.3 20.5  19.9  54.5 30.5 116.6  Index=68.7%
Directional Including 
Own  244.2 28.8  33.1  77.5 56.4 160.0   
Net Directional 
Spillovers (TO – FROM)  144.2 -71.2  -66.9  -22.5 -43.6  60.0   
Notes:  Each cell in the 6x6 matrix section of the Table reports the relative (n percentage terms) contribution of 
the “column” country to the variance of the forecast error for the “row” country. “Directional FROM Others” column 
reports the total variance (of the forecast error) share attributable to other countries. “Directional TO Others” row 
reports the sum of the contributions of each country to all other countries’ variance of forecast errors. “Directional 
Including Own” row reports the sum of the contributions of each country to the variance of forecast errors for all 
G-6 countries.  Each cell in the “Net Directional Spillovers (TO-FROM)” row reports the difference between the 
corresponding cells in the “Directional TO Others” row and the ones in the “Directional FROM Others” column. 
The Index is the sum of the elements of the “Directional FROM Others” column (similarly,  the “Directional TO 
Others” row) divided by the total possible variance contributions, which is by definition equal to 600 for 6 
countries.   
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Notes: The spillover index is calculated for 5-year rolling sample windows based on a Vector Error Correction 
model with 3 lags.  The index is denoted in percentage terms. Gray bars indicate the U.S. recessions. 
 
Figure 2. Business Cycle Spillover Index (Generalized VD based ) and Cholesky VD 
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Notes: See Figure 1. 
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Figure 3.  . Business Cycle Spillover Index (Generalized variance decomposition based ) 
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Notes: See Figure 1.  
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Figure 4. Business Cycle Spillover Indices for G-6 countries 
(1958:01-2009:05) 
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b) 6-year rolling window 
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c) 7-year rolling window  
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Notes: See Figure 1. 
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    Notes: See Figure 1. 
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Notes: See Figure 1.  
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Table A-1: Correlation Coefficients - 12-monthly Growth Rates of Industrial Production 
(1962:01-2009:05) 
 Canada  France  Germany  Italy  Japan  UK  USA 
Canada  1            
France  0.507 1           
Germany  0.459 0.602  1         
Italy  0.522 0.622  0.505  1       
Japan  0.531 0.583  0.622 0.624  1     
UK  0.531 0.467  0.488 0.380 0.447  1   





Table A-2: Correlation Coefficients - Monthly Growth Rates of Industrial Production 
(1961:02-2009:05) 
 
  Canada France  Germany  Italy Japan  UK  USA 
Canada 1             
France 0.084  1           
Germany 0.087  0.078  1       
Italy 0.080  0.227  0.047  1       
Japan 0.193  0.165  0.146  0.053  1     
UK 0.151  0.160  0.150 0.185  0.097 1   
USA 0.379  0.044  0.091  0.120 0.261 0.160  1 
  